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Responding to Environmental Risk: A
Pluralistic Perspective
ROBERT V. PERCIVAL*
LIMA, Peru, Jan. 5 (Reuters) - The International Commit-
tee of the Red Cross has been providing cigarettes for the
smokers among the hostages being held by Marxist guer-
rillas [at the Japanese embassy in Peru], and other hos-
tages have insisted on having non-smoking areas. 'We are
taking in cigarettes, both Western and Japanese,' said
Ronald Bigler, a Red Cross spokesman. 'We are trying to
help the hostages make it through the day, to ease the
ordeal.' But the Red Cross's supply of cigarettes to the hos-
tages - along with food, water and fresh clothes - may have
annoyed as many captives as it saved from withdrawal
symptoms. Nonsmokers among the hostages insisted on
establishing smoking and non-smoking areas, said Carlos
Aquino Rodriguez, a hostage who was freed on Dec. 22.1
Throughout history, our species has been forced to con-
front a multiplicity of perils, including many generated by fel-
low humans and others of natural origin. Wars, famines, and
natural disasters threaten health in ways that are immediate
and obvious. Today, humans also are concerned over far less
conspicuous risks, such as the long-term health effects of ex-
posures to toxic substances. Even hostages held by terrorists
now deem it only reasonable that they be shielded from the
* Professor of Law, Robert Stanton Scholar & Director, Environmental
Law Program, University of Maryland School of Law. This essay is based on a
transcript of a presentation made at the 1997 Annual Meeting of the Associa-
tion of American Law Schools on January 6, 1997. The author would like to
thank Rachel Schowalter, Apple Chapman, L. Elizabeth Coco and Yvette Pena
for research assistance.
1. Non-smoking Sections for Hostages, NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 6, 1997, at
A4.
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risk and annoyance of exposure to second-hand smoke, as
noted above.
Environmental law's explosive growth is a product of
public demand for protection against environmental risks.
While the regulatory infrastructure erected by these laws re-
mains relatively young, recently it has come under unprece-
dented attack. Critics argue that contemporary regulatory
priorities are seriously misplaced, wasting enormous re-
sources responding to relatively trivial risks due to public
alarmism. 2 They recommend giving greater decisionmaking
authority to experts insulated from public pressure,3 requir-
ing more detailed risk assessments and cost-benefit analyses
as a prerequisite to regulation, and limiting or preempting
common law liability for certain environmental risks.4
These criticisms have been debated extensively else-
where,5 and it is not the purpose of this essay to repeat this
debate. Instead this essay articulates a more pluralistic vi-
sion of regulatory policy that respects the historical roots of
environmental law and the complementary relationship be-
tween regulation, common law liability and market forces. It
discusses how the contemporary regulatory state emerged af-
ter the common law proved inadequate to control risks of
widely dispersed, latent harm in the face of inevitable scien-
tific uncertainty. Rather than imposing more detailed ana-
lytical thresholds that would return regulatory policy to a
common law model, environmental policy should embrace
preventative regulation while cultivating more flexible regu-
latory standards that harness the power of liability and mar-
2. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EF-
FECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993).
3. See Stephen Breyer, Foreword: Beyond the Vicious Circle, 3 N.Y.U.
ENvTL. L. J. 251, 252 (1995).
4. See, e.g., Peter W. Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of
Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1985).
5. See, e.g., Robert V. Percival, Regulatory Evolution and the Future of En-
vironmental Policy, UNIV. CHI. LEGAL FORUM (forthcoming 1997); David A.
Wirth and Ellen K Silbergeld, Risky Reform, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1857 (1995);
Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit
State, 48 STAN. L. REV. 247 (1996); Lisa Heinzerling, Political Science, 62 UNIV.
CHI. L. REV. 449 (1995).
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ket forces as mechanisms for controlling risk. The essay
identifies recent trends that suggest that regulatory policy is
beginning to move in this direction.
I. From the Common Law to the Contemporary
Regulatory State
Federal regulation now has taken center stage in soci-
ety's efforts to protect human health from exposure to envi-
ronmental risks. Most of the laws that require the
establishment of regulatory standards are of recent origin. 6
During the last three decades an enormous volume of federal
regulatory legislation was adopted in response to the public's
desire to minimize involuntary exposure to risk. This goal,
which has been pursued relatively consistently across broad
(and diverse) swaths of public policy, is at the root of much
federal environmental regulation. It also is consistent with
the common law's emphasis on protecting against foreseeable
harm. The rise of the modern regulatory state is largely a
product of the difficulties faced by the common law in re-
sponding to risks of widely dispersed, latent harm, such as
the harms caused by environmental pollutants and toxins.
Uncertainty is the very essence of the concept of risk, for
risk involves harm that occurs in a probable fashion, affecting
some, but not all of those exposed to a particular substance or
activity. The pervasiveness of uncertainty concerning the ul-
timate effects of environmental pollutants and toxins is the
primary reason why the contemporary regulatory state dis-
placed the common law as the first line of defense for public
health. The common law's requirement of individualized
proof of causal injury is very difficult to satisfy in cases where
environmental pollutants cause widely dispersed, latent
harm.
Early in this century, the Supreme Court was called
upon to umpire disputes concerning egregious interstate air
and water pollution problems applying the federal common
6. For a history of the enactment of federal environmental legislation see
Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contempo-
rary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1160 (1995).
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law of nuisance. In a case where a single massive source of
air pollution had dramatically and visibly damaged the sur-
rounding landscape, proof of causal injury was not a major
problem.7 Yet, when the Justices became involved in adjudi-
cating interstate disputes over the effects of raw sewage dis-
posal, they became acutely aware of their inability to serve as
a kind of judicial Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).8
In a few rare cases, federal law sought a regulatory solu-
tion to restrict the use of substances or activities thought to
cause harm to human health or the environment. But these
laws only addressed highly visible examples of acute harm.
For example, one early law required the establishment of
safety standards to prevent steamship boilers from explod-
ing.9 In 1912, Congress passed the little known Esch-Hughes
Act which imposed a federal tax on white phosphorus for use
in match manufacturing. 10 Congress created this tax because
white phosphorus caused workers in match manufacturing
plants to suffer phosphorus necrosis, a disease that dissolved
their jaws into horribly disfigured mounds of puss, a problem
so horrendously visible that President Taft felt compelled to
address it in his State of the Union message in 1910.11
Other problems were neglected because society was to-
tally unaware of the risks generated by new technologies,
particularly those that caused chronic harm only with long
latency periods. For example, both tetraethyl lead and
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) were invented by the same chem-
ist, Thomas Midgley. Both were considered remarkable tech-
nological advances at the time. Midgley himself had been
very concerned about health and safety. He tested thousands
7. See, e.g., Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (emis-
sions from a copper smelter located on the Tennessee side of the Georgia border
found to be a public nuisance with the Court subsequently issuing an injunc-
tion, Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. 237 U.S. 474 (1915)).
8. See, e.g., New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 313 (1921).
9. See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots
and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1149 (1995).
10. See id. at 1150.
11. See id. at 1151. At the time, Congress did not believe it had the consti-
tutional authority simply to ban the use of white phosphorus, so it used federal
taxing authority to respond to the problem.
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/3
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of compounds and rejected many because of safety concerns
before he settled on tetraethyl lead, not realizing that its in-
troduction into gasoline would massively increase cases of
lead poisoning over the next several decades. 12
CFCs were a remarkable advance because that greatly
improved the safety of refrigeration technology, which for-
merly had caused many deaths as a result of the unstable
chemicals that had been used in previous refrigerators. They
also greatly expanded society's capacity to preserve food and
to transport it safely over long distances. Yet, at that time no
one ever thought that CFCs ultimately would threaten to de-
stroy our ozone layer. It was not until the early 1970s that,
almost entirely by accident, two scientists writing an environ-
mental impact statement for the space shuttle came up with
a theoretical calculation showing that CFCs could in fact cre-
ate a chemical reaction that would threaten to destroy the
ozone layer. 13
Earlier in this century, concerns about the health effects
of new technologies were addressed by convening conferences
of experts. For example, after dozens of workers died of lead
poisoning at the first tetraethyl lead plant, the public outcry
that ensued led to the convening of a Surgeon General's con-
ference in 1923. This provided a forum for public health and
technology experts to consider whether the government
should ban the use of tetraethyl lead as a gasoline additive.
After quick studies of the health of workers at filling stations
that used leaded gasoline reached inconclusive results, tetra-
ethyl lead was given a green light without any appreciation of
the serious neurological damage that lead emission ulti-
mately would generate on a massive scale. 14
Beginning in the late 1960s, environmental law began a
swift transformation from a common law system to a regula-
12. This history is recounted in detail in SETH CAGIN & PHILIP DRAY, BE-
TWEEN EARTH AND SKY: How CFCs CHANGED OUR WORLD AND ENDANGERED
THE OZONE LAYER (1993).
13. RIcHARD E. BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY 10 (1991).
14. This experience is recounted in David Rosner and Gerald Markowitz, A
'Gift of God"?: The Public Health Controversy over Leaded Gasoline during the
1920s, 75 AMER. J. PUBL. HEALTH 344 (1985).
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tory one that relies on administrative agencies such as the
EPA. These agencies are authorized to issue regulations
designed to prevent harm before it occurs. However, as the
above examples illustrate, it often is difficult to forecast accu-
rately the environmental effects of new substances or tech-
nologies. Thus, it was essential for courts to grant agencies
the leeway to act even in the face of considerable scientific
uncertainty.
This is illustrated by one of the landmark decisions in
environmental law, Ethyl Corporation v. EPA.15 In Ethyl,
fifty years after the introduction of tetraethyl lead into gaso-
line, the D.C. Circuit considered a challenge to EPA's first
regulations limiting the amount of lead that could be added
to gasoline. By a 2 - 1 vote the court initially struck down the
regulations. Lead poisoning was a widespread problem and
EPA could calculate that gasoline combustion released a tre-
mendous amount of lead into the environment. However, the
majority of the three-judge panel held that EPA could not
limit the lead content of gasoline until it could prove that spe-
cific harm actually had occurred, harkening back to a com-
mon law standard of proof of causal injury. 16
The D.C. Circuit then took the case en banc and reversed
by the barest of margins: 5 - 4. The Court's en banc decision,
written by Judge J. Skelly Wright, concluded that it was not
necessary to show that actual harm had occurred before lead
additives could be regulated.' 7 Noting that precautionary
regulation would be "impossible" if courts demanded "rigor-
ous step-by-step proof of cause and effect," the court held that
agencies could act to prevent harm even in the face of uncer-
tainty by using the available evidence to make rational as-
sessments concerning potential risks.18 The precautionary
principle reflected in this decision served as a model for fu-
15. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc).
16. See the discussion in Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 519-20
(8th Cir. 1975) (en banc). Articles critical of the initial panel decision are cited
in the D.C. Circuit's subsequent en banc decision in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541
F.2d 1, 11 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc).
17. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc).
18. See id.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/3
1997] RESPONDING TO ENVIRONMENTAL RISK 519
ture federal regulatory policy. It also permitted regulators to
gather the data that later made a compelling case for remov-
ing all lead from gasoline. 19
Four years later, the U.S. Supreme Court established
limits on the ability of agencies to engage in precautionary
regulation. In a 1980 case commonly referred to as the Ben-
zene decision, the Court declared that it was not enough sim-
ply to find that a substance caused harm before regulating it
to the limit of feasibility. Instead, agencies first have to de-
termine that the risks posed by a regulatory target are "sig-
nificant" and that the contemplated regulatory action would
appreciably reduce them.20 While the Court's decision was
embodied in a plurality opinion that addressed statutory lan-
guage unique to the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA), ultimately it has created a kind of federal common
law directing agencies to conduct quantitative risk assess-
ments prior to taking regulatory action.21
While the Ethyl and Benzene decisions define the legal
contours of precautionary regulation, they do not provide a
clear answer to the quintessential question of modern regula-
tory policy: how much proof of harm is required before an
agency can regulate? While Ethyl indicates that agencies
need not wait for the kind of individualized proof of causal
injury that the common law would require, Benzene requires
them to do more than simply identify potential hazards - they
must quantify them, if possible, and determine that they are
significant and can be appreciably reduced. Whether this
would permit an agency to stop the introduction of yet an-
19. See ELLEN K. SILBERGELD AND ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, THE ORGA-
NOMETALS: IMPACT OF ACCIDENTAL ExPosuRE AND EXPERIMENTAL DATA ON REG-
ULATORY POLICIES, IN NEUROTOXICANTS AND NEUROBIOLOGICAL FUNCTION (H.
Tilson & S. Sparber, eds. 1987).
20. See Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum In-
stitute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
21. In 1981, the Supreme Court clarified that agencies were not required to
base their regulatory decisions on the use of cost-benefit analysis. American
Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 488 (1981). How-
ever, the Benzene decision stimulated government agencies, including EPA, to
conduct quantitative risk assessments before imposing costly regulations on in-
dustries, substantially increasing the informational threshold for issuing envi-
ronmental regulations.
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other toxic metal into gasoline without detailed proof con-
cerning the adverse health effects of elevated ambient
concentrations of that substance remains in dispute today.22
As a practical matter, the difficulties regulatory agencies
face in issuing standards has undermined environmental
law's promise of preventative regulation. Even in the ab-
sence of legislation requiring agencies to base decisions on
cost-benefit analysis, some federal courts have interpreted
existing regulatory statutes to place seemingly impossible an-
alytical requirements on agencies. For example, EPA labored
for ten years to develop a comprehensive rule to phase out all
remaining uses of asbestos. 23 The agency decided that this
approach was far more efficient than continuing to try to pre-
vent human exposure to asbestos throughout the life cycle of
products in which it is used because asbestos poses a sub-
stantial risk of life-threatening diseases even at very low
levels of exposure. EPA found that there were adequate sub-
stitutes available for most remaining uses of asbestos and
that substitutes would be developed for the others, in the face
of a technology-forcing regulation.24 Despite EPA's extensive
cost-benefit analysis, the Fifth Circuit struck down this regu-
lation on the ground that the agency had not analyzed all the
costs and benefits not only of an asbestos ban, but of all inter-
mediate alternatives, 25 oblivious to the agency's conclusion
that only a phaseout could adequately control the risks. This
decision is widely viewed as a "death knell" for comprehen-
sive preventative regulation on a multimedia basis under the
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA).26
22. See Kevin L. Fast, Treating Uncertainty as Risk: The Next Step in the
Evolution of Environmental Regulation, 26 ENv. L. REP. 10627 (1996) (arguing
that EPA's use of safety factors in reference concentrations for assessing the
risks of allowing a manganese additive into gasoline shifts to a "guilty until
proven innocent" standard for toxic chemicals).
23. See Asbestos: Manufacture, Importation, Processing, and Distribution
in Commerce Prohibitions. 54 Fed. Reg. 29,460 (1989).
24. See id.
25. See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1229-30 (5th Cir.
1991).
26. Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1996).
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/3
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Another significant initiative to overcome the chemical-
by-chemical approach to regulation was struck down by the
Eleventh Circuit in a case known as the Air Contaminants
decision.2 7 This case involved the effort by OSHA during the
Bush administration to update in a comprehensive fashion its
400 permissible exposure limits for toxins in the workplace.
OSHA did not seek to adopt unreasonably stringent stan-
dards, but rather simply to bring its admittedly outdated reg-
ulations up to the levels of current industry consensus
standards. Yet the Eleventh Circuit held that OSHA must
perform individualized risk assessments for each chemical
and feasibility assessments for each industry subsector
before it could adopt such a regulation.28 This decision erects
such a high informational threshold for regulation as to make
it virtually impossible for OSHA even to update the vast ma-
jority of its standards. 29 This further undermines the ability
of agencies to protect public health through preventative
regulation.
II. Expertise, Public Perceptions, and Regulatory
Decisionmaking
Much of the current debate over risk regulation is a prod-
uct of sharply different visions concerning the rationality of
public perceptions of environmental risk. Those who focus
largely on quantitative risk assessments argue that regula-
tory priorities are misplaced because the public is too con-
cerned about some risks that are statistically smaller than
others.30 EPA's own expert risk assessors have found that
the agency's regulatory priorities are more closely aligned
with the relative -strength of public concerns over certain
risks than with the products of their comparative risk assess-
27. AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962 (11th Cir. 1992).
28. See id. at 975-76.
29. See Dennis J. Paustenbach, OSHA's Program for Updating the Permis-
sible Exposure Limits (PELs): Can Risk Assessment Help "Move the Ball For-
ward?", 5 RIsK IN PERSPECTIVE 1 (Jan. 1997).
30. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EF-
FECTIVE REGULATION 20 (1993).
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ments.31 Yet risk regulation choices implicate a far richer
mix of values than simple comparisons of statistical esti-
mates of lives saved. These include the voluntariness of ex-
posures to risks, fairness in the distribution of risks,
uncertainty, the potentially catastrophic nature of certain
risks, environmental damage and non-fatal health effects. 32
What is striking about this debate is that economists,
whose discipline traditionally has not questioned the ration-
ality of consumer preferences, have been among the harshest
critics of the public's regulatory priorities.33 Rather than
viewing harmony between current regulatory priorities and
public preferences as a sign of a functioning, pluralistic de-
mocracy, these critics decry it as a misallocation of societal
resources because the public seemingly places a higher value
on controlling certain risks than cost-benefit analyses do.34
This is not meant as an indictment of economics, for that dis-
cipline recently has made significant advances in developing
a richer understanding of the factors that shape consumer
preferences. Incorporating lessons from psychology and ex-
perimental studies,3 5 rational choice theory is moving away
from the traditional expected utility maximization model to-
31. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A
COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS (1987); U.S. ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REDUCING RISK: SETTING PRIORITIES AND STRATE-
GIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1990).
32. See Victor B. Flatt, Should the Circle Be Unbroken?: A Review of the
Hon. Stephen Breyer's BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION, 24 ENV. L. 1707 (1994); Lisa Heinzerling, Political Science, 62
UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 449, 471 (1995); Adam M. Finkel, A Second Opinion on an
Environmental Misdiagnosis: The Risky Prescriptions of BREAKING THE VICIOUS
CIRCLE, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 295, 321 (1995).
33. See, e.g., Robert Hahn, Achieving Real Regulatory Reform, 1997 UNIV.
CHI. LEGAL FORUM (1997).
34. See id. While Hahn argues that the public would make different choices
if they were more aware of the true costs and benefits of regulation, he underes-
timates the degree to which estimates of the costs and benefits of regulation
were considered when regulatory legislation was adopted. See Robert V. Perci-
val, Regulatory Evolution and the Future of Environmental Policy, 1997 UNIV.
CHI. LEGAL FORUM n.98 (1997).
35. See Cohn Camerer, Behavioral Decision Theory, in THE HANDBOOK OF
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth, eds. 1995); Eldar
Hafir, Itamar Simonson & Amos Tversky, Reason-Based Choice, 49 COGNITION
11 (1993).
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/3
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ward one that understands the importance of context and en-
dowment effects in shaping consumer values and
preferences. 36
Arguments that regulatory policy should place more
weight on quantitative analyses conducted by "experts" than
on the public's assessment of risks must appreciate the tre-
mendous uncertainty that surrounds analyses of the prospec-
tive effects of regulation. Often it has proven to be the case
that risks are more serious than previously thought and that
the costs of regulation are far less than ex ante estimates.
There are numerous examples of these phenomena. At the
time of the Ethyl decision, the recommended safe level for
lead in childrens' blood was forty micrograms per deciliter.
Subsequently, it has been lowered to between ten and fifteen
micrograms per deciliter because scientists have learned a lot
more about the extent to which very low levels of lead can
cause neurological damage.37 Scientists also discovered that
low levels of lead cause other types of health damage by in-
creasing blood pressure in adult males. In addition, it is now
well known that the phaseout of lead additives in gasoline,
which was initiated by EPA during the Reagan Administra-
tion, cost far less than any ex ante estimate.
CFCs are another good example. A recent study esti-
mates that there are 1.5 million fewer skin cancer cases each
year in the United States alone because of international ac-
tion to phaseout the use of these substances. 38 At the same
time, the cost of complying with the phaseout has plunged
dramatically. In 1988, a partial phaseout of CFCs to a 50%
reduction, was estimated to cost about twice as much as an
estimate for an accelerated total phaseout of CFCs four years
later.39
36. See Mark Kelman, Yuval Rottenstreich & Amos Tversky, Context-De-
pendence in Legal Decision-Making, 25 J. LEGAL STUDIEs 287 (1996).
37. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAw, Sci-
ENCE & POLICY 631 (2d ed. 1996).
38. See Harry Slaper et al., Estimates of Ozone Depletion and Skin Cancer
Incidence to Examine the Vienna Convention Achievements, 384 NATURE 256
(1996).
39. See Percival, et al., supra note 37, at 1282.
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More recently, the ex-post cost-benefit analyses that have
been conducted of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments 40 sug-
gest that there have been enormous societal benefits that
were not appreciated at the time the legislation was adopted
despite the vocal opposition of many economists. One exam-
ple of how the costs of the 1990 CAAA have proven to be far
less than originally estimated is provided by the emissions
allowances for sulfur dioxide, which the CAAA allow to be
traded in the open market. When Congress decided to adopt
the system of emissions allowance trading, it was estimated
by industry that it would cost about $1000 - $1500 per ton to
reduce sulfur dioxide emissions. Now that emissions al-
lowances are trading on the open market, they are selling for
around $100 per ton.
It is not surprising that society frequently underesti-
mates prospective risks while overestimating prospective
costs. Estimates of risk depend upon what risks are as-
sessed. Until there is a reason to suspect that a substance or
activity might create certain kinds of risks, such as the risk
CFCs posed to the ozone layer or the effect of lead on blood
pressure, prospective risk assessments have no reason to con-
sider such effects. With respect to the costs of regulation,
business interests have a tremendous incentive to avoid regu-
lations that may increase their costs. Thus, they often en-
gage in strategic behavior to forestall regulation by
exaggerating estimates of the likely costs of regulation.
Moreover, until regulations actually are adopted and imple-
mented, there is little incentive for developing new technol-
ogy that would reduce the cost of complying with more
stringent environmental standards.41
Opportunities for public policy to intervene to protect
against risks are episodic and often depend on seemingly ran-
dom political factors that make particular risks salient regu-
latory targets at certain moments in time. When this occurs,
prospective estimates of risks and costs should be viewed as
40. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (CAAA), Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104
Stat. 2399 (1990).
41. See Finkel, supra note 32, at 369-71.
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/3
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dynamic and subject to revision over time, rather than as the
foundation for one-time, all-or-nothing regulatory decisions.
Ultimately, an even-handed regulatory policy that seeks to
improve the public's understanding of risks and the costs of
controlling them may offer the best hope for improving regu-
latory priorities by influencing what issues command policy-
makers' attention.42
Despite criticism of the public's risk perceptions, people
are becoming more sophisticated in their attitudes toward
risk. The concern of the hostages held at the Japanese em-
bassy in Peru over second-hand smoke is well founded, as
confirmed by recent studies. 43 Indeed, the current remarka-
ble groundswell of concern over the risks of smoking and the
role of tobacco companies in promoting this deadly addiction
paints a brighter picture concerning the public's capacity to
absorb information about environmental risk, particularly
when responsible government policy seeks to play a leader-
ship role in informing public opinion. 44
One may legitimately question who the real "experts"
are. Rather than a high priesthood of quantitative risk asses-
sors, the public may do a better job of assessing some risks
and it may respond more quickly than the regulatory system
when information about risks becomes available. The history
of CFC regulation demonstrates that it was the public who
simply stopped buying aerosol spray cans, propelling the
United States to deal with that risk in the early 1970s, a deci-
sion that proved remarkably prescient.45 In similar fashion,
the environmental groups who pushed for elimination of lead
42. See Robert V. Percival, The Ecology of Environmental Conflict: Risk,
Uncertainty and the Transformation of Environmental Policy Disputes, 12
STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 209 (1992) (discussing how environmen-
tal policy disputes get on the public agenda and means for improving the pub-
lic's understanding of environmental risk issues).
43. Denise Grady, Study Finds Secondhand Smoke Doubles Risk of Heart
Disease, NEW YORK TIMES, May 20, 1997, at Al.
44. Kevin Sack, For the Nation's Politicians, Big Tobacco No Longer Bites,
NEW YORK TIMES, Apr. 22, 1997, at Al.
45. See Joby Warrick, Disaster Averted, Experts Say, WASH. POST, Nov. 21,
1996, at A2 (reporting on study finding that phaseout of ozone-depleting sub-
stances has prevented 1.5 million cases of skin cancer each year in the United
States alone).
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from gasoline in the early 1970s could be considered more
"expert" in their armchair risk assessments because they ad-
vocated something that took nearly two decades to accom-
plish, but which is now widely viewed as one of the most
dramatic environmental success stories. Progress toward im-
proved public confidence in our regulatory system will only
continue if we continue to pursue a pluralistic approach to
public policy that affords the public substantial input into de-
cisions concerning how to respond to environmental risks. It
will not occur if we move instead toward a system that em-
powers a group of so-called experts insulated from the polit-
ical process to decide how to respond to risk.
III. Emerging Trends in Regulatory Policy
Regulatory policy appears to be moving in several posi-
tive directions. Concern that regulatory policy often is inflex-
ible and unfair in its application 46 has spawned efforts to
"reinvent regulation" and other initiatives that are moving
regulatory policy toward some of the values that animated its
common law roots. Regulators are exhibiting a greater will-
ingness to modify standard default assumptions in risk as-
sessments in circumstances where they can be shown to be
inappropriate. 47 They are now focusing more on fairness to
individuals, particularly individuals who are the most sensi-
tive to environmental risks.48 As a result of the growing "en-
46. See Philip K Howard, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: How LAw IS SUF-
FOCATING AMERICA (1994).
47. A report released by the Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk
Management in June, 1996 recommends a system where it will be possible, in
certain circumstances, to relax some of the default assumptions that typically
go into risk assessments, if it can be demonstrated that there are good reasons
in an individual case for believing that the normal assumptions about extrapo-
lating from animal tests to humans are not valid. Michael Baram, Risky Busi-
ness, 104 ENVTL. HEALTH PERsp. 1040 (1996).
48. For example, the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-170,
110 Stat. 1489 (1996), requires EPA to give special attention to the risks of
sensitive populations such as children exposed to pesticides. See James D. Wil-
son, Resolving the "Delaney Paradox," RESOURCES 14 (Fall 1996). It also re-
quires EPA to assess the risks of endocrine disruption, a growing concern
among scientists. In April 1997, President Clinton issued an executive order
directing all federal agencies to identify and address environmental risks that
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/3
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vironmental justice" movement, regulatory policy is becoming
more concerned over how to protect (and compensate) those
upon whom risk is disproportionately concentrated.
49
One of the most encouraging trends is the growing recog-
nition that regulation is only one of a larger set of tools soci-
ety can use to manage environmental risks. Common law
liability, market forces, and environmental regulation are
highly complementary mechanisms for helping society cope
with risk. Each has its distinct advantages and drawbacks.
Thus, the best strategy for society to address the portfolio of
risks it faces is to employ the three in a combination that em-
phasizes the strengths of each.
Market forces can play an important role in protecting
human health by generating economic incentives for mini-
mizing involuntary exposure to risk, particularly in circum-
stances where consumers are informed of risks and can
choose to avoid them by altering their consumption behav-
ior.50 While our current regulatory infrastructure emerged in
response to the perceived inadequacies of the common law for
responding to environmental risk, common law principles
also retain enormous vitality in society's overall risk reduc-
tion policy, as Professor Marshall Shapo explains.51 The com-
mon law reflects social judgments concerning the morality
and efficiency of activities that affect others52 and it enables
judges to assess the reasonableness of risks despite the enor-
mous uncertainties that bedevil quantitative risk assess-
may disproportionately affect children. Exec. Order No. 13,045, 62 Fed. Reg.
19,885 (1997). This order creates an interagency Task Force on Environmental
Health Risks and Safety Risks to Children to advise the President on how to
respond to such risks.
49. See Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7,629 (1994).
50. Regulatory policy is now seeking to enhance the power of the market-
place by requiring far more extensive public disclosures of information concern-
ing potential risks. The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050, and the toxic release inventory it created now
provide the public with unprecedented information about releases of toxic
chemicals.
51. Marshall S. Shapo, Tort Law and Environmental Risk, 14 PACE ENVTL.
L. REV. 801 (1997).
52. Jonathan Bender, Societal Risk Reduction: Promise and Pitfalls, 3
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 255, 266-67 (1995).
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ment.53 While the common law generally looks backward in
assessing the reasonableness of events that already have
transpired,54 these judgments can have a powerful effect in
shaping future conduct by articulating what society considers
to be reasonable. When regulators neglect to control risky ac-
tivities that cause widespread harm, the common law is soci-
ety's primary vehicle for responding, as illustrated by the
asbestos tragedy55 and the recent flurry of litigation against
the tobacco industry.56
IV. Conclusion
Public demand to prevent involuntary exposure to risk
has produced a comprehensive set of environmental laws that
authorize agencies to issue preventative regulations. While
regulatory policy has fallen short of the law's promise of com-
prehensive protection, transferring greater regulatory au-
thority to experts insulated from public pressure would not
ensure improved policy, but could undermine public confi-
dence in the regulatory system. Recent developments appear
to be moving us towards a regulatory system that places
more emphasis on regulatory fairness and more individual-
ized determinations of risk. This moves environmental regu-
lation closer to some of the values that animated common law
standards, while seeking to preserve the benefits of prevent-
ative regulation. These and other developments are amplify-
ing the complementary nature of the common law, market
53. See Shapo, supra note 51.
54. To be sure, the common law does have doctrines of anticipatory nui-
sance, but the difficulty of forecasting environmental damage has meant that,
for the most part, common law liability attaches only after harm has become
manifest.
55. See, e.g., David Rosenberg, The Dusting of America: A Story of Asbestos
- Carnage, Cover-up and Litigation, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1693, 1695 (1986)
(describing the tort system "as the uniquely effective means of exposing and
defeating the asbestos conspiracy, providing compensation to victims and deter-
ring future malfeasance.")
56. The long history of the tobacco industry's successful efforts to avoid ef-
fective regulation is discussed in detail in RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES:
AMERIcA's HUNDRED-YEAR CIGARETTE WAR, THE PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE UN-
ABASHED TRIUMPH OF PHILIP MORRIS (1996).
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forces and environmental regulation as mechanisms for con-
trolling environmental risk.
As this essay goes to press, the pluralistic nature of soci-
ety's response to environmental risk is being illustrated in
dramatic fashion by the tobacco industry's stunning decision
to agree to a $368 billion settlement of liability claims.57
While the fine print is just beginning to surface, the magni-
tude of the proposed settlement reaffirms the common law's
vitality as a vehicle for addressing risks that had escaped ef-
fective regulation. 58 Moreover, a veritable sea change in pub-
lic opinion toward the tobacco industry may illustrate how
responsible government policy can help shape public atti-
tudes towards risk. With improved public understanding,
regulatory policy is capable of amplifying the power of com-
mon law liability and market forces to protect against envi-
ronmental risks, creating additional opportunities for
improving the fairness and efficiency of public policy.
57. John M. Broder, Cigarette Makers in a $368 Billion Accord to Curb
Lawsuits and Curtial Marketing, NEW YORK TIMES, June 21, 1997, at Al.
58. Perhaps the most revealing index of the common law's power is the
enormous energy that has been expended on behalf of efforts to restrict tort
liability. Indeed, the proposed tobacco settlement has forced advocates of such
"tort reform" measures to scramble to modify them for fear that they would
insulate the industry from liability that it was now willing to accept. See Suein
L. Hwang, Deal Is Close in Tobacco Negotiations, WALL ST. J., June 13, 1997, at
A3 (reporting an effort in Congress to exclude tobacco products from proposed
legislation to cap punitive damages in response to concerns expressed by 16
state attorneys general that it would undercut their negotiating position in the
tobacco settlement talks). In June 1997, California, which had enacted legisla-
tion giving the tobacco industry immunity from products liability suits, re-
pealed the law and joined 36 other states in suing the industry. Milo Geyelin,
California is 37th and Biggest State to Sue Tobacco Industry for Costs, WALL ST.
J., June 13, 1997, at B9.
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